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RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN POST-KATRINA
NEW ORLEANS CAN BE APPLIED TO POST-SANDY
NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
Daniel Abramson
I. Introduction
In 2012, a Category 1 hurricane named Sandy made its way up the
East Coast of the United States, leaving in its wake a path of destruc-
tion.' Despite the categorical lack of severity compared to other hur-
ricanes, Sandy caused unprecedented devastation in New York and
New Jersey which was said to be worse than that done by Hurricane
Katrina, which hit New Orleans, Louisiana in 2005.2 Sandy's devasta-
tion in the region included 94 of the known 125 U.S. fatalities caused
by the storm as well as the destruction of tens of thousands of homes.'
While the residents were left to pick up the pieces, many asked what
larger action was called for to address the destruction caused by
Sandy.
1. Hurricane Sandy, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/mission-pages/hurricanes/
archives/2012/h2012_Sandy.html (last visited April 18, 2013). A Category
1 hurricane is the least severe designation for a storm strong enough to be
a hurricane. Categories range up to 5.
2. See Charline Israel, Hurricane Sandy's Devastation Deeper than Katrina, CHRIS-
TIAN BROADCASTING NETWORK (Nov. 27, 2012) http://www.cbn.com/cbn-
news/us/2012/November/Hurricane-Sandys-Devastation-Deeper-than-
Katrina/ (quoting New York governor Cuomo as estimating the cost of
storm damage in New York to be approximately $32 billion); Brent John-
son, Hurricane Sandy caused $29.4B in Damage to N.J., Christ Administration
Estimates, THE STAR-LEDGER (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.nj.com/news/in-
dex.ssf/2012/11/hurricane-sandy-causes_294b-to.html (quoting New
Jersey governor Chris Christie as estimating the cost of storm damage in
NewJersey to be approximately $29.4 billion).
3. The Associated Press, Superstorm Sandy Deaths, Damages, and Magnitude: What
We Know One Month Later, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/29/superstorm-hurricane-sandy-deaths-2012
n_2209217.html.
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With the massive damage left behind in the New Orleans area in
2005 by Hurricane Katrina,' questions arise as to what lessons can be
learned as New York and New Jersey attempt to rebuild. In the years
since Katrina, there have been various critiques of state action to han-
dle the reconstruction of New Orleans, particularly in the hard-hit
and low-income Ninth Ward.' While opinions on the effectiveness
and fairness of the reconstruction efforts vary, commentaries suggest
that at least some state action is necessary to recover from a natural
disaster.'
Given the wide breadth of Sandy's damage, any comprehensive
grant of authority to a single body to repair the devastation will neces-
sitate some level of governmental involvement. After analyzing the
initial uncoordinated, inefficient local efforts in New Orleans to re-
build, followed by the establishment of the highly successful Louisiana
Land Trust, I conclude by advocating for the enactment of New Jersey
land bank enabling legislation and for the expansion of the New York
land bank that was just enabled by legislation enacted last year.
II. Background
A. New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Katrina was a Category 3 hurricane that made landfall on
August 29, 2005 along the coast of Louisiana.' The devastation con-
sisted of 1,527 deaths, damage to 90,000 square miles of land-includ-
ing the destruction of 300,000 homes-an estimated economic loss of
$150 billion and a population loss immediately following the storm of
two thirds of New Orleans' residents.' What may be most troubling is
the slow rate at which the city recovered after the storm. Eighteen
4. Hurricane Katrina, NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (updated Dec.
29, 2005), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/special-reports/katrina.html.
5. The Ninth Ward is the largest of 17 wards that make up New Orleans and is
the easternmost downriver portion of the city. John J. Costonic, New Orle-
ans, Katrina and Kelo: American Cities in the Post-Kelo Era, 83 TUL. L. REv. 395
(2008); William P. Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity: Housing that Working and
Poor People can Afford in New Orleans since Katrina, 42 LAKE FOREST L. REv.
393 (2007) [hereinafter Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity]; William P.
Quigley, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Katrina: Human and Civil Rights Left Be-
hind Again, 81 TUL. L. REv. 955, (2007) [hereinafter Quigley, Thirteen Ways
of Looking at Katina]; Shelby C. Stone, Two Tales of One City: Eminent Domain
Post-Katrina and a Response to Kelo, 53 Lov. L. REV. 115 (2007).
6. Both citizens and academics point to instances in which successful redevel-
opment has been accompanied by a focused, organized, and even-handed
approach by elected officials pairing with private groups. Eve Abrams, Blight
and Rebuilding New Orleans, WWNO (May 20, 2012), http://wwno.org/
post/blight-and-rebuilding-new-orleans.
7. Quigley, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Katrina, supra note 5, at 956; Hurricane
Katrina, supra note 4.
8. DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DIsAsTERs AND THE LAw: KATRINA AND BE-
YOND 17 (2006); John J. Costonis, New Orleans, Katrina, and Kelo: American
Cities in the Post-Kelo Era, 83 Tul. L. Rev. 395, 400-01 (2008).
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months after Katrina, approximately 300,000 former New Orleans re-
sidents had not returned and drinkable tap water was not restored to
the entire city for over a year.9
The population loss to New Orleans flung survivors of Katrina all
across the country.o Because New Orleans had a significant problem
with affordable housing prior to the storm, the destruction of those
properties and subsequent removal of the residents led to a wave of
quick evictions." The problem with this policy was that low income
residents had no way of knowing that they had been served an eviction
notice by their landlord having tacked one on their door.'" Federal
litigation in the fall of 2005 changed the requirements to allow more
fair practices to tenants, but the resulting restrictions on development
hindered rebuilding efforts and drove the cost of the limited available
rentals very high.'
In response to the challenges of rebuilding blighted and storm-
wrecked New Orleans, the governor and state legislature created the
Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA), which was charged with oversee-
ing, planning, and coordinating the distribution of funds received for
hurricane recovery.' 4 Local recovery efforts in New Orleans were
bogged down by a multitude of competing plans that the LRA was
initially unsuccessful in distilling and bringing to fruition, despite its
considerable financial and legal authority over planning in the af-
fected areas and millions of dollars spent on various private consulting
firms and think tanks.'" However despite the disjointed beginnings of
9. Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity, supra note 5, at 393-95.
10. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been criticized for
their handling of displaced New Orleaneans. Congress estimated that ap-
proximately 78,000 residents were left behind in the city who lacked the
means to transport themselves to shelters and were taken to the New Orle-
ans Convention Center. From there they were bused to various shelters all
across the U.S. A correlation has been suggested between the distance
from home people were sent and their rate of poverty. Quigley, Thirteen
Ways of Looking at Katrina, supra note 5, at 959-60.
11. Louisiana state law provides that adequate notice of eviction is met by "tack-
ing" an eviction notice on the door of the residence, with eviction hearings
following as soon as a few days later. See LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. arts.
4701-05 (1998). Under Article 4732, "[t]he court shall make the rule re-
turnable not earlier than the third day after service thereof, at which time
the court shall try the rule and hear any defense which is made."
12. Some residents would only learn that eviction proceedings had occurred
upon returning home after being told their neighborhood had been
cleared and restored only to find their furniture gone and someone else
living in their house. Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity, supra note 5, at 401.
13. See Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity, supra note 5, at 401.
14. Id.; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:220.5(C) (1) (a) (Supp. 2007), repealed by Acts
2006, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 5, § 4, eff. July 1, 2010.
15. Various initiatives included an unfunded program by the mayor called
Bring New Orleans Back Commission, a plan by a D.C.-based think tank
called the Urban Land Institute, and a $2.9 million grant to a Miami con-
sultant to create a plan for the 49 affected neighborhoods. The LRA put
pressure on the municipality for failing to advance one cohesive proposal
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recovery efforts in post-Katrina New Orleans, the LRA, together with
the Office of Community Development and the leadership of the vari-
ous parishes, was able to establish the Road Home Program." The
Road Home Program's broad authority to engage in matters related
to its mission is tempered by existing law and infrastructure as well as
its status as a nonprofit corporation.1 7 In the years since its founding,
the Road Home Program has boasted remarkable success in the re-
building of the Louisiana coastal region.'8
B. Land Banks
Land banks are government or nongovernmental nonprofit organi-
zations that work towards eliminating blight through "the conversion
of vacant, abandoned properties into productive use."" Land banks
operate by purchasing properties that have been abandoned or fore-
closed upon and maintain, assemble, facilitate redevelopment of, mar-
ket, and dispose of the land-banked properties.20 Land banks are
"[e]nabled by state legislation and enacted by local ordinances."'
This allows individual communities to determine whether they wish to
make use of lank bank enabling legislation and to tailor individual
articles of incorporation for the land bank to combat the problems
and created its own plan called the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP).
Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity, supra note 5, at 408-09.
16. The Road Home Program (doing business as the Louisiana Land Trust)
has been given broad powers to create a land bank and handle all matters,
including the entering into of any agreements necessary to carry out its
stated mission which is "[t]o finance, own, lease as lessee or lessor, sell,
exchange, donate or otherwise hold or transfer a property interest in hous-
ing stock damaged by Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita." LOUISIANA
LAND TRUST, http://www.lalandtrust.us/ (last visited April 7, 2013).
17. The Louisiana Land Trust is governed by a seven member Board of Direc-
tors, "with one member appointed from a list of three persons nominated
by the president of the Senate and with one member appointed from a list
of three persons nominated by the speaker of the House of Representa-
tives. No less than three of such members shall be a domiciliary of one of
the parishes most affected by Hurricane Katrina and no less than three
members be a domiciliary of one of the parishes most affected by Hurri-
cane Rita." Id. Additionally, any project undertaken by the Road Home
Corporation must adhere to the policy guidelines set forth by the LRA and
provide for the financing thereof as administered by the office of commu-
nity development. 40 La. Rev. Stat. § 600.66 (2013).
18. Through the program, almost 130,000 Louisiana coastal residents have re-
ceived $8.9 billion dollars in aid to rebuild their homes and rental proper-
ties, which comprises more than 99% of eligible applicants. THE ROAD
HOME, http://www.road2la.org/Default.aspx (last visited April 7, 2013).
19. Foreclosure Recovery and Land Banks, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/about/conplan/foreclo-
sure/landbanks.cfm (last visited April 18, 2013).
20. See id.
21. OFFICE OF POLIcy DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, DEP'T OF HOUSING AND UR-
BAN DEVELOPMENT, REVITALIZING FORECLOSED PROPERTIES WITH LAND BANKS
1 (Aug. 2012), http://huduser.org/portal/publications/landbanks.pdf.
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specific to that community.22 By concentrating authority and bargain-
ing power, municipalities may handle the various transactions neces-
sary to repurpose and redevelop blighted areas in the most efficient
manner possible. Land banks are a relatively new practice that are
gaining popularity as a means for blighted communities to combat the
negative effects of high foreclosure rates and the high volume of aban-
doned properties in deindustrialized urban areas.23 Given land banks
were originally designed for the purpose of addressing high foreclo-
sure and abandonment, Louisiana's adoption of the model for storm
relief is a novel and inventive method of handling a similar problem. 24
C. New York and New Jersey and Hurricane Sandy
i. New Jersey
Prior to the storm, New Jersey was facing challenges in real estate
and finance far above the national average. In September, New
Jersey ranked second only to Florida as the state with the highest num-
ber of mortgages facing foreclosure.2 6 One suspected cause of the
above-average backlog in foreclosure proceedings in New Jersey was a
state law that mandates judicial review of all foreclosure cases.27
When Sandy hit, she caused major damage to the Jersey Shore and
Atlantic City, which are the primary destinations for the state's $38
billion tourism industry.2" Despite the high rates of foreclosure and
blight across the state of New Jersey prior to Sandy, the state has de-
clined to enact land bank enabling legislation.29
22. Id. at 1-2.
23. Id.
24. For more information on land banks, see generally OFFICE OF COMMUNITY
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
NEIGHBORHOOD STABILIZATION PROGRAM: LAND BANK FACT SHEET (JULY 9,
2010), http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/about/conplan/foreclosure/doc
/landbanksfactsheet.doc.
25. John Gittlesohn, Sandy Batters New Jersey's Struggling Housing Market, BLOOM-
BERG BUsINESSWEEK (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/
2012-11-01 /sandy-slamming-new-jersey-s-already-struggling-housing-market
#p1 .
26. 7.3% of NJ mortgages were seriously delinquent or had foreclosure pro-
ceedings pending compared with the national average of 3.3%. Id.
27. The law was in response to the sharp rise in foreclosures in 2008 in order to
protect mortgagees as victims of predatory lending and the economy that
suffers as a result of high foreclosure rates. Save New Jersey Homes Act of
2008, 46 N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, Subt. 2, Ch. 1OB §§ 36-52 (West 2008);
Gittlesohn, supra note 25; Stark & Stark, Mandatory Mediation in New jersey
Foreclosure Cases, NEw JERSEY LAw BLOG (Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.njlaw-
blog.com/2008/ 10/articles/community-associations/mandatory-media-
tion-in-new-jersey-foreclosure-cases/.
28. Brent Johnson, Hurricane Sandy caused $29.4B in Damage to N.J., Christ Ad-
ministration Estimates, THE STAR-LEDGER (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.nj.
com/news/index.ssf/2012/11 /hurricanesandy-causes_294bto.html.
29. Identical bills were put before the NewJersey State Senate and Assembly on
January 11, 2012 to allow municipalities to designate existing entities as
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ii. New York
New York was in better economic shape than New Jersey when the
storm hit, but was still damaged badly by Sandy."o Though NewJersey
was second only to Florida in the volume of seriously delinquent mort-
gages, New York was quickly catching up.31 Foreclosure proceedings
in New York take longer than anywhere else in the country which is
causing a swelling backlog of cases that is worrying to investors.3 ' The
high rates of foreclosure, blight, and inefficient management prac-
tices in place to handle these concerns have led to broader action
being taken to rebuild affected communities, including the passage of
land bank enabling legislation in 2012."
D. Eminent Domain Combating Blight
Eminent domain, like the police power, is not enumerated specifi-
cally, but is simply understood to exist." When deciding whether the
government is constitutionally entitled to invoke eminent domain,
two determinations must be made: first, whether the taking is a valid
"public use" and, second, whether the property owner has been pro-
vided 'just compensation.""
land banks, yet the bills have not been voted on as of the writing of this
recent development. Kate M. Kelly, New Jersey Advocates Advance New Land
Bank Legislation, MONARCH HOUSING ASSOCIATEs, (Mar. 7, 2012), http://
monarchhousing.org/2012/03/07/new-jersey-advocates-advance-new-land-
bank-legislation/.
30. See Israel, supra note 2.
31. A seriously delinquent loan is one that is 90 days late or in foreclosure. Dan
Levy & Prashant Gopal, New York Area has Biggest jump in Foreclosure Filings,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Oct. 25, 2012, 12:45 PM) http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/2012-10-25/new-york-area-has-biggest-jump-in-foreclosure-
filings.html.
32. In the third quarter of 2012, when Sandy hit, the foreclosure process in
New York reportedly took "1,072 days, up from 974 days a year earlier."
New Jersey came in second at 931 days. Id.
33. Gov. Cuomo called the program "[a) central part of [his] administration's
urban agenda to help transform struggling urban communities. With these
applications being approved, municipalities will be able to return vacant,
abandoned and tax delinquent properties to productive use." Press Re-
lease, Governor's Press Office, Governor Cuomo Announces Five Munici-
palities Approved to Create Land Banks (May 17, 2012), http://www.
governor.ny.gov/press/05172012-Five-Municipalities-Approved-Create-
Land-Banks.
34. The police power is how governments, both national and state/local, pos-
sess the power to act in the citizens' best interests. Broadly understood to
mean any regulations that pertain to the health, safety, and welfare of the
citizens, eminent domain is the power by which governments may force a
sale of private property by the owner if the land will be put to a public use
either by the government itself or to be assigned to a private third party for
such a use.
35. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution curbs the inherent
power of eminent domain by requiring that any taking of private property
for a public use must be accompanied by just compensation paid to the
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The definition of "public use" in relation to eminent domain is a far
more elusive concept than 'just compensation" and has been left to
the courts and legislatures to define. The definition of "blight" has
also remained vague and elusive." The Supreme Court has histori-
cally taken a highly deferential approach to the determination of
blight and public use." In the decades since Berman v. Parker, emi-
nent domain has been used with ranging levels of success to combat
blight in urban areas." In addition to the elimination of blight, the
Supreme Court has also recently held that major, private, commercial
redevelopment of a distressed area may also satisfy the Fifth Amend-
ment in Kelo v. City of New London." The Kelo ruling was highly contro-
versial, though it had the effect that the Supreme Court apparently
intended.40 By granting a high level of deference to municipal efforts
to combat blight, the ruling invited state legislatures to provide addi-
tional protection to property owners as they deemed necessary to pre-
vent the abuse of eminent domain.41 While various schools of
owner. "No person... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Just compensation is typi-
cally defined as the "fair market value" (FMV) of the property at the time of
the commencement of the action as opposed to the actual sale. FMV is
typically settled as what the property would fetch on the open market ab-
sent the eminent domain action.
36. Blight is a term for the areas of a city affected by high poverty and crime to
such a degree that their very affectation has been argued to be a potential
cause for the complete economic destruction of an entire community. This
vague and relative definition has drawn some criticism since it opens the
door to potential abuse of the eminent domain power by private parties
seeking to develop on owned property. Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public
Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21
YALE L. & Pot'v REv. 1, 6, 18 (2003).
37. The Supreme Court originally held that private-to-private transfers were
not in violation of the Fifth Amendment and that appellant property own-
ers' contention that "blight" should be defined and interpreted narrowly
was invalid. The Court went on to hold that the D.C. legislature was more
qualified than the Court to determine the scope of blight in its own city and
that, because the taking was found not to violate the Constitution, it would
defer to the city's determination. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
38. The most notable movement, which is now largely considered to have been
a failure, was "urban renewal," which was a popular movement that cleared
slums across American cities. The most popular criticisms are that it de-
stroyed existing communities, concentrated poverty, and effectively gutted
sections of cities that have yet to be fully redeveloped. See Pritchett, supra
note 36.
39. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
40. The majority notes the Court's historic practice of deference, "Our earliest
cases in particular embodied a strong theme of federalism, emphasizing the
'great respect' that we owe to state legislatures and state courts in discern-
ing local public needs." Id. at 482.
41. Unease with the Kelo decision prompted no fewer than 42 states to enact
reactionary legislation to curb what was seen as a large grant of power by
the Court. Costonis, supra note 8. For an inventory of state post-Kelo re-
sponses, see 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation
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thought have influenced different states' legislative reactions to Kelo,
both New York and New Jersey have provided in their constitutions
that blight is a permissible justification for eminent domain and have
upheld that principle with case law.12
III. Analysis
A. Private-Public Partnership for Greatest Efficiency
Large-scale social problems like blight or widespread destruction
following a storm such as Sandy or Katrina are best handled through a
cooperative partnership between the public and private sectors.
Sweeping grants of authority necessary for the implementation of
broad redevelopment efforts must be made by the state in order to be
constitutionally valid and enforceable.4 3 However the state alone can-
not efficiently manage such projects. This is evidenced by the initial
failure of the LRA and various private actors to put forth any cohesive
plan of action for rebuilding New Orleans following Katrina." How-
ever, the remarkable rate of success of the Road Home Program is
further evidence of the benefits of a private-public partnership.4 5
Absent a grant of power by the state like the Louisiana Road Home
Housing Corporation Act, no private entity, whether profit-seeking,
nonprofit, or charitable, would ever have valid authority to initiate all
the necessary actions that have allowed the Louisiana Land Trust to
be so successful." If a change in the method of allocating relief and
rebuilding the coastal region had not been made, the inefficiency of
the LRA's initial efforts combined with competing private firms and
interests would have continued. It is the state's responsibility to en-
sure that any grant of power such as the Act is tightly controlled so
that the private actor is allowed to operate with market efficiency
while continuing to act in the interests of the legislature's constituents
as opposed to other market forces." However, absent profit motive,
Since Kelo, CASTLE COALITION (2007), http://wwy.castlecoalition.org/
about/38 (follow "50 State Report Card" hyperlink; then follow "All states
with synopsis and grade summary" hyperlink) (last visited April 9, 2013);
State Eminent Domain and Ballot Measures, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/env-res/
eminent-domain-legislation-and-ballot-measures.aspx.
42. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, para. 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, §1; Ronald K.
Chen, Gallenthin v. Kaur: A Comparative Analysis of How the NewJersey and
New York Courts Approach judicial Review of the Exercise of Eminent Domain for
Redevelopment, 38 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 987, 988-89 (2011).
43. Only the government is legally empowered to initiate an eminent domain
action or a tax seizure. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
44. See Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity, supra note 5, at 408-09.
45. For more information on the Road Home Program's success, see Back-
ground supra Part II.A and accompanying notes 16-18.
46. La. Rev. Stat. § 40:600.66 (2008).
47. This is indicated by the Supreme Court's precedent set by the Kelo ruling,
which upheld private-to-private transfers via eminent domain actions as
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the state alone cannot efficiently handle such large-scale market initia-
tives.4 This is exemplified by the legislation in New York and New
Jersey that makes foreclosure proceedings take longer in the two
states than anywhere else in the country."9
B. New York and New Jersey
The laws inhibiting foreclosure proceedings in New York and New
Jersey are designed to protect homeowners who may have been the
victims of predatory lending."o While well intentioned, the market ef-
fects of these after-the-fact attempts at consumer protection are signif-
icant, negative, and cannot be ignored."' The situation created by the
growing shadow inventory may become disastrous in the region with
so many homeowners affected by Sandy.52 In order to effectively re-
pair the regions affected by Sandy and most efficiently allocate the
billions of dollars in federal relief, both states should apply lessons
taught by Louisiana and enable state land trusts.5
Land bank enabling legislation facilitates the private-public partner-
ship while still allowing individual municipalities the sovereign deter-
mination whether and how to most efficiently implement the program
to meet their specific needs." This notion is consistent with the pre-
cedent set by the Supreme Court in Kelo, acknowledging the efficiency
of private actors, deferring to local municipalities in their own deter-
minations of blight and recovery, and leaving the decision as to
whether to provide greater protection in eminent domain actions to
the states themselves." The facilitation of a central land trust in each
state will concentrate bargaining power and allow for less risky and
constitutional, and prompted individual states to afford further protection
to property owners if they saw fit. Kelo v. City of London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005); see also information on legislative responses to Kelo, supra note 41.
48. The "profit motive" is a term used by economists to refer to the motivation
that enables private entities who must remain profitable to survive to mani-
fest efficient practices that the state, which is not motivated by a need to
achieve profits to survive, cannot match. PAUL BOWLES, CAPITALISM: A
SHORT HISTORY OF A BIG IDEA 9 (2007).
49. See supra note 27.
50. Stark, supra note 27.
51. The disabling legislation has created a ballooning backlog "shadow inven-
tory" that "remains a threat to [the states'] home price stability and
growth." Levy & Gopal, supra note 31.
52. Id.
53. Initial emergency relief in the amount of $9.7 billion was issued to the af-
fected areas. Since then Congress has approved $50.7 billion in emergency
aid for storm victims. Hurricane Sandy Relief Bill, H.R. 41, 113th Cong. § 1
(2013); Raymond Hernandez, House Approves $50.7 Billion in Emergency Aid
for Storm Victims, THE NEW YoRK TIMES (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/01/16/nyregion/house-passes-50-7-billion-in-hurricane-aid.
html? r=0.
54. See OFFICE OF COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, DEP'T OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24.
55. Kelo v. City of London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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less expensive redevelopment in the same way that the Road Home
Act put an end to the skyrocketing rents caused by the shortage of
units that resulted from the judicial interference with redevelopment
in New Orleans."6
Additionally, the concentrated bargaining power would add some
desperately needed efficiency to the backlogged states by reducing
tertiary costs associated with the various transactions necessary for re-
building." Another advantage is that this would address the existing
situation with the shadow inventory in both states as it relates to the
process of storm recovery without attempting to take on the addi-
tional problem of foreclosure backlog or requiring that the legislature
abandon their existing methods of lender protection. Proponents of
measures like the Save New Jersey Homes Act would likely reject any
attempt to establish a central land trust equivalent to the Road Home
Corporation if they believed it would come at the cost of such mea-
sures." This would make equivalent legislation to Louisiana's Road
Home Act much easier to pass in each state and would allow for the
swift addressing of the Sandy crisis while leaving the more controver-
sial issue of foreclosure reform to be dealt with in the future.
IV. Conclusion
The need for drastic and efficient action in the critical revitalization
of communities, devastated either by blight or hurricane, necessitates
allowing one body to act with relative autonomy. This has been seen
with the success of land banks nationally and in Louisiana where the
Road Home Corporation can boast the replacement of 99 percent of
qualified applicants to their homes." In situations where such a large
grant and use of power is necessary, it is important the government
facilitate such action to ensure that the grant is legal, constitutional,
and tailored so that the interests of the public are protected. Since
the government is never as efficient as private actors in the market-
place, the optimal solution is to facilitate redevelopment through a
private-public partnership by issuing carefully considered grants of au-
thority in land bank organizations. This will facilitate market-efficient
outcomes and operations as well as keep risk down. So long as the
56. Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity, supra note 5, at 401.
57. Tertiary costs are costs that result from various legal fees resulting from a
transaction. Tertiary costs are not sought by any party or negotiated as part
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58. 46 N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, Subt. 2, Ch. 10B §§ 36-52 (West 2008) (state law
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government ensures that the people and individual property owners
do not unconstitutionally suffer as a result of the grant of power, eve-
ryone's needs will be met in the most efficient and prudent manner
possible.
